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Introduction 
Whether you are a Christian or not, you cannot deny the truth of 
the proverb “[a] brother offended is more unyielding than a strong 
city, and quarrelling is like the bars of a castle,”1 especially when you 
study the constitutional relationship between the Netherlands and its 
former colonies Aruba, Curacao, and St. Maarten.  
The Netherlands, Aruba, Curacao and St. Maarten are four coun-
tries that together constitute the Kingdom of the Netherlands.2  These 
countries feel so wronged by one another that emotions often take 
over. In July 2014, for instance, the Prime Minister of Aruba desper-
ately went on a hunger strike because he felt that the autonomy of 
Aruba had been illegally infringed upon as the Kingdom Government 
ordered the Governor of Aruba not to sign the country’s budget. The 
reasoning behind this order was in response to an opinion of the 
Kingdom Government that the debt had grown explosively and that 
this budget aggravated the problem.  Subsequently, the Prime Minis-
ter of Aruba believed that the dispute settlement procedure between 
the Kingdom, ‘central’ (predominantly Dutch) government, and ‘lo-
cal’ government was useless.3  He felt that the Dutch government 
would be overrepresented in this procedure, and he was afraid that 
the Dutch government would maintain its stance.4  The Dutch gov-
ernment urged for reasonableness.5  
 
 1. Proverbs 18:19 (ESV). 
2. The Kingdom of the Netherlands is not just a country in North-West Europe headed by 
a King; part of the Kingdom is situated in the Caribbean. In fact, it extends to three 
more Caribbean islands, Bonaire, St. Eustatius and Saba; these three islands are consti-
tutionally part of the Netherlands (in North-West Europe).  STATUUT NED [CHARTER] 
art. 1. 
 3. Premier Eman from Aruba Hunger Strike, DE TELEGRAAF, (July 11, 2014), 
http://www.telegraaf.nl/binnenland/22846081/__Premier_Aruba_in_hongerstaking__.
html. 
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Although the ‘Aruban matter’ has now been resolved, this case 
demonstrates the seriousness of the debates on the interpretation of 
the Charter,6 especially with regard to the division of competencies 
and power between the Kingdom government and the governments of 
the respective countries.7  These conflicts have, of course, a history 
and the underlying emotions go deep. 
Today, the deadlock in the Kingdom’s relationships is marked by 
the absence of an independent dispute settlement procedure, notwith-
standing the agreement between the four countries to establish such 
procedure on the Kingdom’s level.8  For a long time, the Netherlands 
 
4. Although not the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom, which consists of the Dutch 
Council of Ministers plus one minister plenipotentiary of each Caribbean country, but 
a delegation of the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom would decide. For complete-
ness, the dispute settlement procedure is laid down in Art. 12 of the Charter; the key 
‘passages’ of the Article for this purpose read: If the Minister Plenipotentiary of either 
the Netherlands Antilles or Aruba has serious objections to the initial opinion of the Coun-
cil of Ministers on the binding nature of the provision referred to in paragraph 1, or on any 
other matter in the consideration of which he has participated, deliberations thereon shall 
continue at his request, if necessary having regard to a time-limit to be determined by the 
Council of Ministers.  The deliberations referred to above shall be conducted by the Prime 
Minister, two Ministers, the Minister Plenipotentiary and a Minister or special representa-
tive to be designated by the Government concerned.  If both Ministers Plenipotentiary de-
sire to participate in the continued deliberations, these deliberations shall be conducted by 
the Prime Minister, two Ministers and the two Ministers Plenipotentiary. Article 10, para-
graph 2 shall apply mutatis mutandis.  STATUUT NED [CHARTER] art. 12, paras. 2-4. 
 5.  Plasterk Calling Hunger Strike of Eman Undesirable, NEDERLANDSDAGBLAD (July 14, 
2014), http://www.nd.nl/artikelen/2014/juli/14/plasterk-noemt-hongerstaking-eman-
onwenselijk. 
 6.  The Charter is the highest constitutional document of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. 
STATUUT NED [Charter] pmbl. For completeness, this example of the hunger strike is 
only one out of numerous cases of serious conflict. Some other recent cases are: Aru-
ba’s (initially forced) participation in the Common Court of Justice of Aruba, Curaçao 
and St. Maarten and Bonaire, St. Eustatius and Saba.; see, higher (financial) supervi-
sion over Curaçao (although this particular conflict is based on a Kingdom Act, Finan-
cial Supervision Act Curaçao and Sint Maarten, Kingdom Act of July 7, 2010 rather 
than on the Charter and the integrity test on St. Maarten, Integrity test/screening of 
government of St. Maarten, DAILY HERALD  (Oct. 20, 2014),  
http://www.dutchcaribbeanlegalportal.com/news/latest-news/4357-second-chamber-
backs-st-maarten-instruction. 
 7.  The relevant articles are – at least – 3 and 43, STATUUT NED [CHARTER]  art. 3, sub. 1, 
43.  
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defended the stance that they should be able to ultimately overrule 
the Caribbean countries; the Netherlands feels that given that it is the 
largest partner (ca. 17,000,000 inhabitants), its policies must not be 
overridden by the interest of a Caribbean country which represents 
either ca. 35,000 people (St. Maarten), ca. 100,000 (Aruba), or ca. 
140,000 (Curacao).9  The Caribbean countries argue their right to 
self-determination, which means they cannot be overruled in the 
event that the law is applied incorrectly at the expense of their auton-
omy.10  Of course, we do not argue that the Netherlands insists on be-
ing able to breach the law when it wants to enforce its policy.  How-
ever, even if all parties would agree that only disputes about the 
interpretation of the law could be litigated, one must note that the line 
between law and policy is thin. Is interference with national budgets 
based on constitutional norms a matter of law or policy?  Conse-
quently one might wonder if litigation would be the answer to resolve 
this highly emotional issue and whether it could solve the underlying 
conflict. 
In this paper, we propose a different approach to resolve this 
problem inspired by the South African Constitution, which focuses 
on cooperation.11  Section 41, subsection 3 and 4 of the South African 
Constitution reads:  
(3) An organ of state involved in an intergovernmental dis-
pute must make every reasonable effort to settle the dispute 
by means of mechanisms and procedures provided for that 
purpose, and must exhaust all other remedies before it ap-
proaches a court to resolve the dispute;  
 
8.  STATUUT NED [Charter] art. 12A. In May the inter-parliamentarian meeting reopened 
the discussion, by giving their respective governments a clear task to establish a dis-
pute settlement procedure. However, despite this effort, in June the Governments still 
did not reach an agreement on the matter. Kingdom Conference Fails to Agree on Dis-
pute Regulation, DUTCH CARIBBEAN LEGAL PORTAL (June 17, 2015, 8:58 AM), 
http://www.dutchcaribbeanlegalportal.com/news/latest-news/5408-kingdom-
conference-fails-to-agree-on-dispute-regulation. Today, the discussion still prolongs.  
 9.  CORNELIS BORMAN, HET STATUUT VOOR HET KONINKRIJK 22 (Kluwer 2005). 
 10.  Irene Broekhuijse, The constitutional equality of the countries of the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands: reality or perception?, 271-73 (thesis, Utrecht University 2012). 
http://dspace.library.uu.nl/bitstream/handle/1874/254907/broekhuijse.pdf? 
 11.  S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 41.  
13. Id. 
2 LAW AND EMOTIONS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/21/16  6:37 PM 
2015-2016  UB Journal of International Law 
 60 
(4) If a court is not satisfied that the requirements of subsec-
tion (3) have been met, it may refer a dispute back to the or-
gans of state involved.12   
Likewise, rather than focusing on litigation, we focus on cooper-
ation. We believe that the law, specifically the dispute settlement 
procedure, must be framed in such a way that cooperation is promot-
ed.13  Presently, the overarching legal framework seems to be de-
signed in a way that the different interests of the respective countries 
are acknowledged, underpinned, and highlighted. Given the present 
legal framework, which allowed this conflict to arise, and the legacy 
of colonialism, it can be challenging to establish a new paradigm. 
With reference to the communication theory “the Rose of Leary,”14 
we will illustrate why we believe such a paradigm shift may be nec-
essary despite these difficulties. 
In order to develop our argument, we successively provide an in-
sight into the colonial history of the “Dutch West Indies,” discuss 
how the present legal framework stimulates disassociation, and brief-
ly mention the main idea of the Rose of Leary and how this model 
can be used to marginalize the emotional, but particularly conflictual 
situation. We conclude with a brief summary reinforcing our argu-
ment.  
A Historical Background 
Let us begin by providing some insight into the history of the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands. After all, if we are to understand the 
difficulties of today, we have to understand its causes.  As it goes too 
far to give an extensive overview of a history of more than three cen-
turies, which is how long the connection between the Netherlands 
and the Caribbean parts of the Kingdom exists, let us highlight one 
 
 12. Id. 
 13. Although of course we acknowledge that – like in the South-African Constitution – a 
provision must be made to allow for litigation as an ultimum remedium. Id.  
 14. TIMOTHY LEARY, MULTILEVEL MEASUREMENT OF INTERPERSONAL BEHAVIOR: A 
MANUAL FOR THE USE OF THE INTERPERSONAL SYSTEM OF PERSONALITY 1 (1956). For 
a brief and an accessible explanation of this theory, please view: Sjoerd Wapperom, 
Modeling Interpersonal Stance in Affective Conversations in Police Interrogations, U. 
OF TWENTE, ¶ 2.2., http://hmi.ewi.utwente.nl/verslagen/capita-selecta/RT-Wapperom-
Sjoerd.pdf (last visited June 15, 2015).  
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particular and recurring cause that created emotionally deep wounds 
within the Kingdom relationships: colonialism and unfruitful deci-
sions regarding the colonial and later post-colonial administration.15  
Two particular related and recurring causes that have created emo-
tionally deep relationship wounds within the Kingdom are colonial-
ism and unfruitful decisions regarding the colonial and post-colonial 
administration.   
The problem is thus twofold. On the one hand there is this ten-
sion between the metropolis and the (former) colonies, and on the 
other hand, there is great tension between the respective islands.16 Be-
low we limit our discussion of the former observation, as we believe 
that the tension between the metropolis and the (former) colonies 
speaks for itself. We will provide further explanation on the latter ob-
servation below.  
In sum, these islands have been united seemingly against their 
will and without essential common interests.17 Moreover, even after 
the decolonization in 1954, the smaller islands still felt dominated, 
although this time by Curacao, the largest and historically main is-
land.18  The prevailing view was that Curacao took better care of it-
self as an independent unit than the Netherlands Antilles as a whole; 
consequently the islands developed not only a hostile attitude towards 
their former colonizer, the Netherlands, but also towards each other.19 
Disregarding the autonomy granted by the Netherlands, the au-
tonomy was thus not necessarily experienced.  It was not until Octo-
ber 10, 2010 that the five islands20 ceased to be united as a country.21 
 
 15. BORMAN, supra note 9, at 1. 
 16. A.B. VAN RIJN, STAATSRECHT VAN DE NEDERLANDSE ANTILLEN, DEVENTER: W.E.J. 
TJEENK WILLINK 33 (1999). 
 17. H.W.C. BORDEWIJK, ONTSTAAN EN ONTWIKKELING VAN HET STAATSRECHT VAN 
CURAÇAO, 84, 92 (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff 1911). 
 18. VAN RIJN, supra note 16, at 33. 
 19. GERT OOSTINDIE & INGE KLINKERS, GEDEELD KONINKRIJK, DE ONTMANTELING VAN DE 
NEDERLANDSE ANTILLEN EN DE VERNIEUWING VAN DE TRANS-ATLANTISCHE RELATIES 
21-36 (Amsterdam University Press 2012).  
 20. OOSTINDIE & KLINKERS, supra note 19, at 7; CHARLOTTE M.A.M. DUIJF & ALFRED 
H.A. SOONS, THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE DISSOLUTION OF THE 
NETHERLANDS ANTILLES 1 (Wolf Legal 2011), Aruba left the constitutional framework 
of the Netherlands Antilles already on the 1st of January 1986 and acquired the status 
of country within the Kingdom of the Netherlands.  
 21. Id.   
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On this date, the country ‘Netherlands Antilles’ was finally dis-
solved.22 Curacao and St. Maarten became countries within the King-
dom of the Netherlands; constitutionally Bonaire, St. Eustatius and 
Saba, the smallest islands became part of the Netherlands.23  Alt-
hough the dissolution of the country happened peacefully, it left a big 
emotional impact on the islands, which would prove to have far-
reaching consequences. Autonomy was considered a national trophy, 
especially for St. Maarten and previously for Aruba. At last they are 
not dominated by other powers on a day-to-day level, and they have 
decided to defend it forcefully.  The battle for autonomy also had an 
impact on a different level: the legal framework has proven to be able 
to adapt to changes as the result of a conflict.24 Against the original 
will of the Netherlands, the Caribbean countries managed at last to 
renegotiate their constitutional position, thus the conflict proved ef-
fective.25  
During colonial times, there does not seem to be a clear point in 
which the islands cooperated effectively, nor were their common in-
terests detected and promoted. The Netherlands Antilles therefore in-
herited a legacy, which hardly contained any social, economic, cul-
tural infrastructures, or shared interests between the respective 
islands. In essence, six islands that had hardly anything in common, 
were united administratively for centuries. The only theme of the co-
lonial history that unites the islands is the disregard of their distinct 
nature. In 1815, the Kingdom of the Netherlands adopted its first 
Constitution, which divided the islands into two colonies: St. Maar-
ten, St. Eustatius and Saba, on which inhabitants spoke English and 
Curacao (and subordinations, i.e. Aruba and Bonaire), on which the 
local language was Papiamentu/Papiamento.26 
This situation lasted for thirteen years. In 1828, Surinam, Cura-
cao (and subordinations, i.e. Aruba and Bonaire), St. Maarten, St. Eu-
statius, and Saba were administratively united.27  Although each of 
 
 22. Id. 
 23. CHARLOTTE M.A.M. DUIJF & ALFRED H.A. SOONS, THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION 
AND THE DISSOLUTION OF THE NETHERLANDS ANTILLES 1 (Wolf Legal 2011). 
 24. See infra Section 3. 
 25. DUIJF & SOONS, supra note 23, at 15. 
 26. Id.  at 3. 
 27. GERT OOSTINDIE & INGE KLINKERS, DECOLONISING THE CARIBBEAN: DUTCH POLICIES 
IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE  58 (AMSTERDAM UNIVERSITY PRESS 2003).  
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these colonies kept their local administration, they were all responsi-
ble to “Paramaribo,” the capital of Surinam, where the head office of 
the colonial administration was situated.28  Fransen Van de Putte, the 
then Dutch Minister of colonies, admitted that they had nothing in 
common, except for their administration.29 Centuries later, Oostindie, 
a contemporary Dutch historian, commented that the structure was 
indeed unfruitful.30  
In 1845, the administration changed again:  Surinam became a 
separate colony from Curacao (and subordinations), St. Maarten, St. 
Eustatius and Saba.31  The administration of the islands was estab-
lished on Curacao, the largest and main island.32 This change was not 
necessarily beneficial for the islands, since, the difference was not 
merely between the islands and Surinam. As mentioned above, the 
language of the local people in Curacao, Aruba, and Bonaire is Pa-
piamentu/Papiamento, while in St. Maarten, St. Eustatius, and Saba 
the primary language is English.33 Also, the distance between the 
Windward Islands (St. Maarten St. Eustatius and Saba) and the Lee-
ward Islands (Curacao, Aruba and Bonaire) is about 900 kilometers,34 
thus escalating cultural differences. It is unthinkable that the  Wind-
ward Islands and Leeward Island would influence each other cultural-
ly, particularly since the possibilities of communication were still 
limited in the mid-nineteenth century.  In fact, even the islands that 
are relatively close to each other could have tremendous differences. 
For example, Curacao and Bonaire have a history of slavery until Ju-
ly 1st, 1863, whereas Aruba has not;35 St. Maarten also has a history 
of slavery, whereas Saba was famous for piracy.36 Given the circum-
 
 28. BORDEWIJK,  supra note 17, at 63.  
 29. Broekhuijse, supra note 10, at 24. 
 30. Id. at 25.  
 31. VAN RIJN, supra note 16. 
 32. Id. at 28. 
 33. DUIJF & SOONS, supra note 23, at 3. 
 34. Id. 
 35. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EMANCIPATION & ABOLITION IN THE TRANSATLANTIC WORLD 189 
(Junius Rodriguez, Ed. 2007).  
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stances (large distance and limited means of communication), one 
might wonder if all local interests could be sufficiently taken into 
consideration; for example, one might ask whether the administration 
on Curacao was sufficiently aware of the state of affairs on the other 
islands.  
 This question is perhaps the key question in history, for even 
after the colonial administration gained more influence on the coloni-
al affairs, and ultimately after the decolonization in 1954, Curacao 
was always regarded as the ‘main island’ that particularly took care 
of its own affairs; even at (according to emotional experiences) the 
expense of other islands. Without incentives and good infrastructure 
to cooperate,37 the islands ultimately persisted in the dissolution of 
the Netherlands Antilles.38   
One might wonder why it was considered necessary for the six 
islands to remain together after the decolonization in 1954, if it was 
clear that the islands had not much in common and were not attired 
with a good infrastructure and communication abilities. Was the un-
ion of the six islands merely unfruitful, or were there also good caus-
es?  Whether there was good cause falls outside the scope of the pre-
sent discussion. However, one cause which was considered important 
was the ability to maintain a sufficient level of good governance.  
Because the islands are small and fragile, people are prone to favor 
those they know.  How then, could they, for instance, establish an in-
dependent court and maintain a complete judicial system?  The issue 
would be marginalized when representatives of the islands cooperat-
ed in such affairs as, maintaining a judicial system, deciding on the 
spending of public money, etc.39 
 
36. For some more informal information on the historical background of these two islands, 
please view: History and Culture, SABA DUTCH CARIBBEAN, 
http://www.sabatourism.com/history.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2015); Slavery and 
Emancipation, ST. MAARTEN NAT’L HERITAGE FOUND., 
http://www.museumsintmaarten.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id
=83&Itemid=117 (last visited Dec. 17, 2015). 
 37. Etienne Ys, former Prime Minister of the Netherlands Antilles, Presentation at the Na-
tional Constitutional Law Conference of the Netherlands (Dec. 19, 2015). 
 38. DUIJF & SOONS, supra note 23, at 14-15. Except for St. Eustatius, the only island 
which voted in favor of the Netherlands Antilles.  
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The dissolution of the Netherlands Antilles did not, consequent-
ly, establish full autonomy for the Caribbean countries. The Nether-
lands demanded that the islands prolonged their cooperation in cer-
tain affairs, such as maintaining the judicial system.40 The autonomy 
was still greater than the event in which they remained an island terri-
tory of the Netherlands Antilles.  They also faced another novelty that 
potentially affected this newly gained autonomy, which could actual-
ly diminish their level of autonomy.  The newly established Caribbe-
an countries noticed that the Charter was now directly applicable to 
them, including the provision on supervision.41  Since October 10, 
2010, the Netherlands has been willing to make use of their power to 
supervise, whether it was because of disagreement on spending pub-
lic money or because of the appointment of government ministers and 
the alleged malfunctioning of local ‘national’ authorities.42 This re-
sulted from the call for recolonization and the increased accusations 
of ill-government and thievery.  The fact that all Caribbean countries 
‘fight for their autonomy’ against the Netherlands, they may, at last, 
cooperate in order to implement a independent dispute settlement 
procedure. 
For nearly the past five years, governments have sought a solu-
tion to resolve this severe problem.43  Needless to say, that due to the 
economic crisis, which also hit the Netherlands and affected the is-
lands, the solution must be affordable.  Given the tremulous history, 
 
39. The reasons to unite the islands are different from the motives to unite the islands ad-
ministratively in the colonial era. During colonial times the organisation of the admin-
istration of the ‘West-Indies’ changed numerous times. The outcome of a change 
seems usually the result of financial considerations. In any case it did not always seem 
to the benefits of the colony, whilst the administrative structure appears to be most 
economical. 
 40. Aruba continued to participate in the Court of Justice of the Netherlands Antilles when 
it acquired the status of country within the Kingdom. The Court was later renamed: 
The Common Court of Justice of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba.  Luc Verhey, 
Slotakkoord of nieuw begin, enkele algemene beschouwingen over het nieuwe kon-
inkrijk, in WETTEN VOOR DE WEST, 27, 29 (Alfred Roos & Luc Verhey ed. 2010).  
 41. Irene Broekhuijse & Roxan Venter, Constitutional Law from an Emotional Point of 
View: Considering Regional and Local Interests in National Decision-Making, XXVII 
WORLD CONGRESS OF THE INT’L ASS’N FOR THE PHIL. OF L. AND SOC. PHIL. (IVR) 15 
(2006), https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B7v1_whu0-coRXFpTFJuYVl3LTg/view.  
 42. Id. at 12.  
 43. Verhey, supra note 40. 
2 LAW AND EMOTIONS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/21/16  6:37 PM 
2015-2016  UB Journal of International Law 
 66 
it could be difficult to reach an agreement that will satisfy all coun-
tries. 
The Present Legal Framework 
So far, we established that the conflicts within the Kingdom of 
the Netherlands are of a serious nature and that these negative feel-
ings are fed by historical events. Besides these, there are other causes 
of disassociation that need to be taken into account: the structure of 
legal framework; the maximization of the autonomy of the respective 
countries; and the structure of the Kingdom institutions.44  The struc-
ture of the institutions encourages and fosters the respective countries 
to plea for their own cause, rather than promoting a focus on common 
interests.  The aforementioned legal framework will be spelled out 
below in the interest of completeness.45  
A. Autonomy 
Concretely, after the decolonization of the Dutch West Indian 
colonies, emphasis was laid on the autonomy of the Caribbean coun-
tries of the Kingdom.46 In short, three legal orders (then: the Nether-
lands, Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles, at present four: the 
Netherlands, Aruba, Curaçao and St. Maarten were created within the 
international legal subject ‘the Kingdom of the Netherlands.’47  
 
 44. Kingdom of the Netherlands: One Kingdom – Four Countries; European and Carib-
bean, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF., 
https://www.government.nl/documents/leaflets/2015/06/05/kingdom-of-the-
netherlands-one-kingdom-four-countries-european-and-caribbean.  
 45. Paragraphs 3.1 and 3.2 are adapted from the paper written by Broekhuijse for the 
World Congress on Constitutional Law, June 16-20, 2014 in Oslo. Given it is not part 
of an argument but the basic explanation of the constitutional framework, it has not 
been rewritten for the present purposes. Also, for illustration we have additionally in-
corporated numerous articles of the Charter. For more information on the legal frame-
work please see, Broekhuijse & Venter, supra note 41 (the legal framework is briefly 
spelled out in the joint paper of Venter and Broekhuijse, which has also been submit-
ted for the XXVII World Congress of the International Association for the Philosophy 
of Law and Social Philosophy).  
 46. Carribean Parts of the Kingdom, New Constitutional Order, GOV. OF THE 
NETHERLANDS (Dec. 15, 2008), https://www.government.nl/topics/caribbean-parts-of-
the-kingdom/contents/new-constitutional-order.  
 47. Id.  
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The Caribbean countries of the Kingdom conduct all affairs in-
dependently,48 unless the Charter indicates that the Kingdom has ju-
risdiction.49 As it states, the number of Kingdom affairs is limited; 
these can be found mainly, but not exclusively50 in the Articles 3 par-
agraph 1 and Article 43 paragraph 2 of the Charter, as well as in Arti-
cle 5.  These articles state: 
 
Article 3 Paragraph 1 
Without prejudice to provisions elsewhere in the Charter, 
Kingdom affairs shall include: 
a. Maintenance of the independence and the defence of 
the Kingdom; 
b. Foreign relations; 
c. Dutch nationality; 
d. Regulation of the orders of chivalry, the flag and the 
coat of arms of the Kingdom; 
e. Regulation of the nationality of vessels and the 
standards required for the safety and navigation of 
seagoing vessels flying the flag of the Kingdom, 
with the exception of sailing ships; 
f. Supervision of the general rules governing the ad-
mission and expulsion of Dutch nationals; 
g. General conditions for the admission and expulsion 
of aliens; 
h. Extradition.51 
Article 43 
1. Each of the Countries shall promote the realization of 
fundamental human rights and freedoms, legal certainty 
and good governance. 
 
 48. Albeit not entirely, as mentioned above the Caribbean countries still have to cooperate 
with each other in certain affairs for purposes of good governance. However, in prin-
ciple they are autonomous. 
 49. OOSTINDIE & KLINKERS, supra note 27, at 94.   
 50. See, e.g. STATUUT NED [Charter] arts. 44 & 45. 
 51. Translation of this and other articles by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department of 
Translation (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Directie Vertalingen (AVT)). Bulletin 
of Acts and Decrees of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Nov. 1, 2010, 4.  See 
STATUUT NED [Charter] art. 3. 
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2. The safeguarding of such rights and freedoms, legal cer-
tainty and good governance shall be a Kingdom affair.52 
 
Article 5 
1. The Monarchy and the succession to the Throne, the Or-
gans of the Kingdom referred to in the Charter, and the 
exercise of royal and legislative power in Kingdom af-
fairs shall be governed, if not provided for by the Char-
ter, by the Constitution of the Kingdom. 
2. The Constitution shall have regard to the provisions of 
the Charter. 
3. Articles 15 to 20 inclusive shall apply to any proposal 
for amendment of the Constitution containing provisions 
concerning Kingdom affairs, as well as to the Bill stating 
the grounds for considering such a proposal.53 
 
It may be added, that Article 5 relates to the ‘autonomy’ of the 
Netherlands. Article 5 provides that the Caribbean countries are to be 
involved in the amendment of the Constitution to the extent that the 
amendment relates to the organization and competences of, for ex-
ample, the legislative and the administrative powers.54  This is on ac-
count of the agreement with Kingdom authorities.  Also, it must be 
stated that Article 43 section 2 of the Charter is no more than a safe-
guard.55  In principle, the countries are autonomous.  According to 
the memorandum, the Kingdom authorities are only permitted to in-
terfere in the event that the authorities of the country cannot restore 
the situation by themselves.56 However, the measures taken by the 
Kingdom government have to be proportional.57  
 
 52. Bulletin of Acts and Decrees of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Nov. 1, 2010, 14-15. 
See STATUUT NED [Charter] art. 43. 
 53. Bulletin of Acts and Decrees of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Nov. 1, 2010, 4-5. 
See STATUUT NED [Charter] art. 5. 
 54. STATUUT NED [Charter] art. 5. 
 55. STATUUT NED [Charter] art. 43, sec. 2 (emphasis added). 
 56. Id.; Irene Broekhuijse, The Challenges of the Constitutional Structure of the Kingdom 
of the Netherlands: A ‘Quasi-Federal’ State in Post-Colonial Context, 7 (2014), 
https://www.jus.uio.no/english/research/news-and-
events/events/conferences/2014/wccl-cmdc/wccl/papers/ws2/w2-broekhuijse.pdf. 
 57. STATUUT NED [Charter] art. 51; The Challenges of the Constitutional Structure, supra 
note 57.  
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Furthermore, in Article 39, the Charter stipulates the principle of 
legal concordance with regard to several areas.  Article 39 states: 
 
Article 39 
Civil and commercial law, the law of civil procedure, crimi-
nal law, the law of criminal procedure, copyright, industrial 
property, the office of notary, and provisions concerning 
weights and measures shall be regulated as far as possible in 
a similar manner in the Netherlands, Aruba, Curacao and St 
Maarten (section 1). Any proposal for drastic amendment of 
the existing legislation in regard to these matters shall not be 
submitted to or considered by a representative assembly un-
til the Governments in the other Countries have had the op-
portunity to express their views on the matter (section 2).58 
Arguably, neither country is entirely autonomous in these affairs.  
 
B. Autonomy Guaranteed when Cooperating 
Under Article 38 of the Charter, the countries can cooperate in 
autonomous affairs, should they desire to do so.59 It is even possible 
that the respective governments will negotiate on agreements that 
will later become legislative proposals. During the entire legislative 
procedure, in the event the proposal has been amended by parliament 
in a way that is deemed unacceptable, the respective governments can 
declare on behalf of their country that the consensus ceases to exist.60 
C. Influence in Kingdom Affairs 
A large degree of autonomy was awarded to the Caribbean coun-
tries of the Kingdom as well, insofar as matters dealt with by the 
Kingdom.  However, the decisive power in Kingdom affairs remains 
ultimately in the hands of the Netherlands, making the Caribbean 
countries’ power marginal.61 
 
 58. STATUUT NED [Charter] art. 39. 
 59. STATUUT NED [Charter] art. 38. 
 60. Cf. Van Dijk, Consensuswetgeving: Een Bijzonder Concept, 25 REGELMAAT 6, 321-
335 (2010).  
 61. BORMAN, supra note 9, at 26. 
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Due to the scarcity of manpower in Kingdom affairs available to 
Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles, one sought to participate in 
Dutch institutions, such as: the Council of Ministers,62 the Council of 
State,63 the Court of Cassation,64 and the States General (i.e. Parlia-
ment). In sum, the key authorities of the Caribbean countries with re-
gard to their say in Kingdom affairs include: Articles 10, 12, 15, 16, 
17, 18, and 23.65  
Despite the connection with the Dutch institutions, these King-
dom institutions are constitutionally distinct. Remarkably, the one 
exception is that there is no Kingdom parliament; nor can Dutch Car-
ibbean people vote for the Dutch parliament.66 As Steven Hillebrink, 
a Dutch scholar, argues: “[t]here is no Kingdom parliament, although 
it could be argued that the Dutch parliament, the Staten-Generaal, 
functions as such, because it approves Kingdom acts and internation-
al treaties, and applies to the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba.”67  
The Caribbean representation in these institutions is minimal, 
and apart from the Council of Ministers of the Kingdom of the Neth-
erlands, optional.68  By way of compensation for this minimal repre-
sentation a number of provisions were included in order to counteract 
possible unilateral dominance by the Netherlands.69 Examples of such 
provisions, other than the aforementioned Articles 12 (the ‘conflict 
procedure’) and 18 of the Charter, include Articles 12a70 and 38a,71 as 
of the last 2010 Amendment. Apart from those sections, the spirit of 
 
 62. Id. at 93. 
 63. Art. 17 Council of State Act (addressing the  task to advise the Government). Art. 18 
Council of State Act (addressing the task to advise the Parliament).   
 64. In private law, criminal law and in tax law.  
 65. STATUUT NED [Charter] art. 10, 12, 15-18, 23. 
 66. Steven Hillebrink, Political Decolonization and Self-Determination; The Case of the 
Netherlands Antilles and Aruba 176 (Dissertation Leiden University 2007), 
https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/11003/000-proefschrift-
hillebrink-10-01-2007.pdf?sequence=1.  
 67. Id. at 147 (remarked in BORMAN, supra note 9, at ¶ 5.9) (emphasis added). 
 68. Hillebrink, supra note 66, at 147. 
 69. Broekhuijse, supra note 10, at 24. 
 70. Id. at 9.  Article 12a: Provisions shall be made by Kingdom Act for settling disputes be-
tween the Kingdom and the Countries which are designated by Kingdom Act. It is this 
procedure that we are presently still awaiting.  
 71. Id.  Article 38a: The Countries may enter into mutual arrangements for settling disputes 
between them. Article 38, paragraph 2 applies. See STATUUT NED [Charter] art. 38, sub. 
a. 
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the Charter, constitutional equality, would occupy a central position 
in Kingdom relationships. However, rather than being the conflict 
procedure for resolving the issue, it is far more often a source of irri-
tation: the countries essentially plea for their own cause and this 
makes it a competition with ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. 
The Rose of Leary 
So far we have mainly focused on the problems and some of 
there causes within the Kingdom.  In this paragraph we work towards 
a proposed solution: from conflict to cooperation. Although in the in-
troduction of this paper we acknowledge our inspiration from the 
South-African Constitution, which focuses on cooperation, we take it 
one step further and pay attention to the communicative theory ‘the 
Rose of Leary’ (for matrix view, see appendix II).  We argue that this 
theory is useful for the present purpose despite the fact that it has 
been written based on the behavior and personalities of human beings 
and not on that of states.  In our view, it can be used to explain the 
actions and reactions between states, and in general behavior. Both 
people and states/governments (groups of people) can be, for in-
stance, dominant, rebellious, distrustful, or cooperative.  In addition 
to the South-African Constitution, this model could assist to establish 
more specifically which kind of behaviour parties should show in or-
der to create the most beneficial outcome: whether one should take 
the lead and others should follow, and if so to what degree.  The law 
could then be framed to promote this behaviour. 
A. The Theory in a Nutshell 
In the 1950s, a scientist named Timothy Leary co-developed a 
theory on personalities and behaviour.72 His most famous work in this 
regard perhaps, is The Interpersonal Diagnosis of Personality, pub-
lished in 1957.73 The original work is highly technical and mathemat-
ical,74 but other authors have simplified it over time.75 
 
 72. TIMOTHY LEARY, INTERPERSONAL DIAGNOSES OF PERSONALITY: A FUNCTIONAL 
THEORY AND METHODOLOGY FOR PERSONALITY EVALUATION 15-16 (1957). 
 73. Id. 
 74. LEARY, supra note 14. 
 75. LEARY, supra note 72. For the sake of completeness, the simplified model is the one 
we studied. 
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The model that Leary presents is a circular matrix, which con-
tains two main axes.76 The vertical axis relates to dominance (the top 
part of the axis) and submission (the bottom part of the axis); the hor-
izontal axis relates to hostility (the left part of the axis) and the 
‘love’/cooperation (the right part of the axis).77 Within this diagram, 
one finds different ways of interaction, of which eight are, according 
to Arthur L. Kobler, distinguished as “generic ways of interaction for 
the use as the overall variable system.”78 These are, in counterclock-
wise order:  
(1) Managerial-Autocratic,  
(2) Competitive-Narcissistic,  
(3) Aggressive-Sadistic,  
(4) Rebellious-Distrustful,  
(5) Self-Effacing-Masochistic,  
(6) Docile-Dependent,  
(7) Cooperative-Overconventional, and  
(8) Responsible-Hypernormal.79  
To make it simpler, as described by Sjoerd Wapperom as: “(1) lead-
ing, (2) helping, (3) cooperative, (4) dependent, (5) withdrawn, (6) 
defiant, (7) aggressive, and (8) competitive.”80  
In sum, these types of behavior are not ‘merely’ classified in the 
matrix, but the model can also be used as a prediction for reactions.  
For instance, as Wapperom explains, dominant behavior invites sub-
missive behavior and vice versa, and aggressive behavior invites ag-
gressive behavior, just as cooperative behavior, invites cooperative 
behavior.81  Kingdom partners could use this knowledge, not only to 
be become aware of the issue, but also to influence others positively, 
to see if the deadlock could be overcome. 
 
 76. Id. at 2. 
 77. Id.  
 78. Arthur L. Kobler, Book Review, 29 HUM. BIOLOGY 378, 379-80 (1957). 
 79. Id.   
 80. Sjoerd Wapperom, Modeling Interpersonal Stance in Affective Conversations in Police 
Interrogations, U. OF TWENTE, ¶ 2.2., http://hmi.ewi.utwente.nl/verslagen/capita-
selecta/RT-Wapperom-Sjoerd.pdf (last visited June 15, 2015).  
 81. Id. 
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Conclusion 
In this present paper, we provided basic insight into the historical 
background and current legal structure of the Kingdom of the Nether-
lands in order to illustrate how these causes contribute to and foster 
present conflictual situations. Historically, the islands were adminis-
tratively united for centuries: first in colonial times, and then after the 
decolonization in 1954—notwithstanding the fact that they had hard-
ly anything, if anything at all, in common.82 Although in spite of this 
required unnatural collaboration, there were also reasons to keep the 
islands united after the decolonization.  It was held that, given their 
small scale, it would be in the interest of the quality of the govern-
ment and judicial system in which the islands continued to cooperate. 
This forced collaboration resulted in a situation in which the islands 
did not wish to cooperate with each other at all and, finally in 2010, it 
led to the dissolution of the Netherlands Antilles.83  Although the is-
lands that became countries gained a high level of autonomy in re-
spect to each other, the dissolution of the Netherlands Antilles poten-
tially diminished their autonomy at the core.  Whereas, in the event 
that the Netherlands, being the largest and ultimately responsible 
partner within the Kingdom, interferes, the Netherlands Antilles 
could function as a shock-absorber for the islands Aruba, Curacao 
and St. Maarten that are now directly exposed to the influence of the 
Netherlands.84  
In the introduction of this paper, we established that the Nether-
lands has not been shy to use this power. Consequently, new issues 
arose because the Caribbean countries, who fiercely defend their au-
tonomy, accuse the Netherlands of “recolonization.”85 The Nether-
lands, on their turn, defend and justify the interference, claiming that 
their actions are constitutional and, moreover, necessary to maintain 
the public order. It seems that in 2010, when the Charter was revised 
in order to realize the dissolution of the Netherlands Antilles, all par-
 
 82. Broekhuijse, supra note 10, at 45. 
 83. Id. at 19. 
 84. Id. View for instance the case of St. Maarten and the issue of good governance. In the 
early/mid nineteen-nineties, the supervision went via the Governor of the Netherlands 
Antilles; he could instruct the local authorities. Today, the Governor of St. Maarten is 
instructed directly by the Kingdom government.  
 85. Premier Eman, supra note 3. 
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ties anticipated a conflict. In a new Article 12a, it was arranged that 
they would find a way to establish a suitable dispute settlement pro-
cedure.86  For a long time, we kept searching for a solution within the 
existing paradigm, the existing legal framework. However, this para-
digm fosters conflictual situations, so it is doubtful if a “solution” 
within this paradigm would ever resolve the matter. After all, as es-
tablished, the present legal framework focuses particularly on the 
maximization of the autonomy and political disassociation in the 
Kingdom institutions. 
Indeed, there are (predominantly private) initiatives that focus on 
cooperation, but we need the law in order to cure this situation of 
non-collaborative behaviour, because some core issues, such as good 
governance are at stake. It becomes clear that today, the historical 
background, combined with the present legal framework, pushed the 
Kingdom relationships in the left “hostile” part of the circle of “the 
Rose of Leary,” which we discussed.87 We argue that if we are to 
marginalize the conflicts within the Kingdom relationships, we 
should not focus on the resolution of the legal conflicts, e.g., through 
litigation; instead, we need to position ourselves in the right “cooper-
ative” part of the circular matrix.88  It is this side of the matrix that 
serves the better purposes for the Kingdom relationships.  Conse-
quently, when the governments design the required and promised 
dispute settlement procedure, they need to take into account that its 
nature would be collaborative rather than competitive, such as litiga-
tion or constitutional review.  Of course, it is understandable that giv-
en the legacy this might be difficult.  However, as long as the gov-
ernments of the countries within the Kingdom of the Netherlands do 
not change in attitude, it is possible that the real, underlying conflicts 
can be resolved.   
 
 
 
 86. This article states: Provisions shall be made by Kingdom Act for settling disputes be-
tween the Kingdom and the Countries which are designated by Kingdom Act. It is this 
procedure that we are presently still awaiting.  Broekhuijse, supra note 11, at 69. 
 87. Wapperom, supra note 80, at 2. 
 88. Id. It falls outside the scope of this paper to establish in which concrete corner(s). 
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APPENDIX I: A Selection of Articles from the Charter 
Article 10 
1. The Minister Plenipotentiary shall participate in the 
deliberations of the Council of Ministers and of the 
permanent boards and special committees of the 
Council whenever Kingdom affairs are discussed 
which affect the Country in question. 
2. The Governments of Aruba, Curacao and St Maarten 
shall be entitled to appoint – if they see reason to do 
so in relation to a particular matter – a Minister, in 
addition to the Minister Plenipotentiary, to partici-
pate with an advisory vote in the deliberations re-
ferred to in the preceding paragraph. 
Article 12 
1. If the Minister Plenipotentiary of Aruba, Curacao or St 
Maarten, indicating his reasons for expecting that a pro-
posed instrument containing generally binding rules 
would be seriously detrimental to his Country, has de-
clared that his Country could not be bound by such an in-
strument, the instrument may not be adopted in such a 
way as to apply to the Country concerned, unless such a 
course would be inconsistent with the Country’s ties with 
the Kingdom. 
2. If the Minister Plenipotentiary of Aruba, Curacao or St 
Maarten has serious objections to the initial opinion of 
the Council of Ministers on the binding nature of the pro-
vision referred to in paragraph 1, or on any other matter 
in the consideration of which he has participated, deliber-
ations thereon shall continue at his request, if necessary 
having regard to a time-limit to be determined by the 
Council of Ministers. 
3. The deliberations referred to above shall be conducted by 
the Prime Minister, two Ministers, the Minister Plenipo-
tentiary and a Minister or special representative to be 
designated by the Government concerned. 
4. If several Ministers Plenipotentiary desire to participate 
in the continued deliberations, these deliberations shall be 
conducted by these Ministers Plenipotentiary, the same 
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number of Ministers and the Prime Minister. Article 10, 
paragraph 2 shall apply mutatis mutandis. 
5. The Council of Ministers shall take a decision in accord-
ance with the result of the continued deliberations. If the 
opportunity for continued deliberations has not been uti-
lised within the time-limit specified, the Council of Min-
isters shall decide. 
 
Article 15 
1. The King shall forward Bills for Kingdom Acts, at the 
same time as they are introduced in the States General, to 
the representative assemblies of Aruba, Curacao and St 
Maarten. 
2. If a Bill for a Kingdom Act was initiated by the States 
General, the Bill shall be forwarded by the House of Rep-
resentatives immediately following its introduction in the 
House of Representatives. 
3. The Minister Plenipotentiary of Aruba, Curacao or St 
Maarten shall have the power to propose that the House 
of Representatives initiate a Kingdom Bill. 
 
Article 16 
The representative assembly of the Country in which the 
legislation is to apply shall be empowered, before the Bill 
is publicly debated in the House of Representatives, to 
examine the Bill and to issue a written report thereon, if 
necessary within a fixed time-limit. 
 
Article 17 
1. The Minister Plenipotentiary of the Country in which the 
legislation is to apply shall be afforded the opportunity to 
attend the debates on the Bill in the States General and to 
furnish such information to the Senate and House of Rep-
resentatives as he considers desirable. 
2. The representative assembly of the Country in which the 
legislation is to apply may decide to designate, for the 
purposes of the debate on a particular Bill in the States 
General, one or more special delegates who shall like-
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wise be empowered to attend the debates and furnish in-
formation. 
3. The Ministers Plenipotentiary and the special delegates 
shall be immune from  
any legal proceedings in respect of anything they say in 
or submit in writing to the meetings of the Senate or 
House of Representatives. 
4. The Ministers Plenipotentiary and the special delegates 
shall be empowered to propose amendments to a Bill dur-
ing the proceedings in the House of Representatives. 
 
Article 18 
1. Before a final vote is taken on any Kingdom Bill in the 
Senate and House of Representatives, the Minister Pleni-
potentiary of the Country in which the legislation is to 
apply shall have the opportunity to express his opinion on 
the Bill. If the Minister Plenipotentiary states his opposi-
tion to the proposal, he may request the House at the 
same time to postpone the vote till the following meeting. 
If, after the Minister Plenipotentiary has stated his oppo-
sition to the Bill, the House of Representatives adopts it 
with a majority of less than three-fifths of the number of 
votes cast, the proceedings shall be suspended and the 
Council of Ministers shall consider the Bill further. 
2. If the meetings of the Senate or House of Representatives 
are being attended by special delegates, the power re-
ferred to in paragraph 1 shall devolve upon the delegate 
designated for the purpose by the representative assem-
bly. 
 
Article 23 
1. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands 
in respect of legal cases in Aruba, Curacao and St Maar-
ten, and also in Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba, shall be 
regulated by Kingdom Act. 
2. If the Government of Aruba, Curacao or St Maarten so 
requests, the said Kingdom Act shall provide for the ad-
dition of a member, an extraordinary member or an advi-
sory member to the Court. 
3.  
2 LAW AND EMOTIONS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/21/16  6:37 PM 
2015-2016  UB Journal of International Law 
 78 
APPENDIX II: The Rose of Leary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The model which has been attributed to Leary89 
 
 
 
 89. LEARY, supra note 72, at 2. 
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The model used by Wapperom90 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 90. Wapperom, supra note 80, at 2. 
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